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SEX MARKERS ON BIRTH 
CERTIFICATES: REPLACING THE 
MEDICAL MODEL WITH SELF-
IDENTIFICATION 
Emily Blincoe* 
Section 28 of the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995 allows people 
to apply to the Family Court to change the sex marker on their birth certificate. This article argues 
that this provision is outdated and does not go far enough in providing legal recognition for trans 
people. It is based on the medical model of sex, and requires medical evidence that the applicant's 
body conforms sufficiently to that of the "nominated sex". The major problem with this requirement 
is that the required medical interventions are unavailable or undesirable for many trans people, so 
should not be a basis for legal recognition. The medical model also privileges medical and judicial 
expertise above a person's own identity and experience. This article suggests a reform based on the 
self-identification model, which exists in Argentina for birth certificates, and in New Zealand for 
passports and drivers' licences. Such a reform of s 28 would bring birth certificates in line with 
these other documents, leading to more consistency and increased respect for the human rights of 
trans people. 
I INTRODUCTION 
When a birth is registered, a sex is recorded on the birth certificate. This is the starting point of 
medical and legal classification of bodies into categories of female and male. Most people go 
through life identifying as the sex/gender assigned to them at birth; that is, they are cisgender. For 
example, I am a cisgender woman and so I have a birth certificate and other identity documents that 
match my identity. I do not have to prove anything about my genitals, chromosomes, hormones, 
lifestyle or behaviour in order to be legally (or socially) recognised as a woman. Trans people, 
whose identities do not match the sex assigned to them at birth, are frequently denied legal 
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recognition, or heavily scrutinised in order to attain it. One situation where trans people face 
particular scrutiny is in correcting the sex marker on their birth certificate. As a cisgender person 
this issue does not affect me and it is important to recognise that I am writing about it from a 
position of privilege.1 For trans people, however, legal recognition (or conversely the denial of it) 
has very real consequences.  
The ability to change sex markers on birth certificates is of vital importance to some people. 
This includes trans people, who are:2 
… those people who do not perceive or present their gender identity as the same as that expected of the 
group of people who were given the equivalent sex designation at birth.  
I use "trans" as an umbrella term which encompasses a range of identities that fit this definition, 
including transgender and transsexual.3 In doing so I recognise that many people who could be 
described as trans do not identify with that term. For example, Māori may identify as whakawahine, 
hinehi, hinehua, or tangata ira tane, and Pasifika people may identify as fa'afafine (Samoa), fakaleiti 
(Tonga), akava'ine (Cook Islands), mahu (Hawai'i), vaka sa lewa lewa (Fiji), rae rae (Tahiti) or 
fiafifine (Niue).4 These terms can only be understood within their cultural context and are not 
translations of English concepts.5 
Sex and gender are contested terms which have in various contexts been both distinguished and 
equated by both the law and by trans people seeking legal recognition.6 In this article I focus on sex 
rather than gender because it is sex that is recorded on birth certificates, however I acknowledge that 
  
1  For a discussion of cisgender privilege generally, see Julia Serano Whipping Girl: a Transsexual Woman on 
Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity (Seal Press, Emeryville, 2007) at ch 8. 
2  Stephen Whittle Respect and Equality: Transsexual and Transgender Rights (Cavendash Publishing, 
London, 2002) at xxii. 
3  These concepts are contested and debates about their meaning are outside the scope of this article. See 
Serano above n 1, at 25–27; and Dean Spade "Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender" (2003) 18 
Berkeley Women's LJ 15 at 15–16, n 2. 
4  Human Rights Commission To Be Who I Am: Report of the Inquiry into Discrimination Experienced by 
Transgender People (2007) [Transgender Report] at 13; Aids Foundation "Pacific Island Sexual Minority 
Gathering" (19 October 2007) Scoop <www.scoop.co.nz>. 
5  See generally Tess Lomax "Whakawahine – a Given or Becoming?" in Jessica Hutchings and Clive Aspin 
(eds) Sexuality and the Stories of Indigenous People (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2007) at 82; and Niko 
Besnier and Kalissa Alexeyeff (eds) Gender on the Edge: Transgender, Gay, and Other Pacific Islanders 
(University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, 2014). 
6  For an excellent summary of different legal and theoretical positions on this, see Laura Grenfell "Making 
sex: law's narratives of sex, gender and identity" (2003) 23 LS 66 at 91–100. For a trans perspective which 
rejects the distinction between sex and gender, see Dylan Vade "Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: 
Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender People" 
(2005) 11 MIJGL 253 at 278–284. 
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gender is the more socially and culturally relevant identity. I use the words "trans woman" and 
"trans man" where relevant. "Trans" is an adjective, which describes one aspect of a person's 
identity – a trans woman is a woman who was assigned male at birth.7 Some trans people (and some 
people who are not trans) do not identify as either male or female. These identities include non-
binary, genderqueer, androgynous, bigendered and non-gendered. I use the words "they" and "their" 
as singular pronouns rather than the more conventional "he or she" and "his or her", to acknowledge 
and respect this range of identities.8  
Trans people are frequently subjected to medical and legal scrutiny in order to achieve 
recognition of their sex/gender. This high standard is often impossible to attain, leaving people with 
identity documents that do not match their identity. The process has been simplified for passports 
and for the drivers' licence register in New Zealand. However, the law for changing sex markers on 
birth certificates remains restrictive. It is governed by s 28 of the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and 
Relationships Registration Act 1995 (BDMRRA). In this article I argue that the medical model of 
sex that this section is based on is out-dated, and that s 28 should be reformed so that it is based on 
self-identification. 
Another group who may not identify with the sex on their birth certificate is intersex people; 
that is, people who are "born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn't seem to fit the 
typical definitions of female or male".9 A small number of such people are recorded as 
"indeterminate" at birth, but most are assigned either male or female by doctors.10 It is possible for 
intersex people to correct the sex marker on their birth certificate to be intersex rather than male or 
female, using s 85 of the BDMRRA. There has been at least one successful application under this 
section. It was required that the applicant prove that the sex they were assigned on their birth 
certificate was an error and that they should have been recorded as "indeterminate".11 This is very 
difficult to prove.  
For the majority of intersex people, s 85 will not apply, so they will have to use s 28 in order to 
change the sex on their birth certificate.12 Many of the criticisms I raise in relation to trans people 
  
7  Serano, above n 1, at 29. 
8  "They" and "their" have long been used as pronouns when the gender of the person in question is either 
unkown or irrelevant. See for example, Catherine Soans "Faceoff: 'he', 'he or she', 'he/she', 's/he' versus 
'they'" (6 June 2012) Oxford Words Blog <blog.oxforddictionaries.com>. Addtionally, many people who do 
not identify as either male or female use "they"/"their" to refer to themselves. See Lee Airton "Why Focus 
on Singular They?" They Is My Pronoun <theyismypronoun.wordpress.com>. 
9  Intersex Society of North America "What is intersex?" Intersex Society of North America <www.isna.org>. 
10  Transgender Report, above n 4, at 7.32 and 7.38. 
11  Human Rights Commission Human Rights in New Zealand: Ngā Tika Tangata O Aotearoa (2010) at 313.  
12  Transgender Report, above n 4, at [7.26]. 
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have similar implications for intersex people.13 There are, however, no available cases about 
intersex people using s 28 so this is not part of my analysis. There may also be different or 
additional criticisms from an intersex perspective. One such criticism relevant to intersex people 
(and some trans people) is that there is no option of changing to "indeterminate" or any other 
alternative that is not male or female. The possibility of a third option for people (whether intersex 
or not) on birth certificates is outside the scope of this article, however, I do recognise that having 
more than two options is an essential aspect of self-identification.14 Also outside the scope of this 
article is whether to remove sex markers on birth certificates entirely.15 
In this article I argue that the medical model which underpins s 28 should be rejected in favour 
of a self-identification model. Section 29, which applies to minors, should also be reformed, but is 
beyond the scope of this article. Part II explains that correct sex markers on birth certificates matter 
to trans people, because if changed they can be used as an affirmation of their identity in various 
contexts. In Part III, I describe the three major approaches to legal recognition of sex: biological, in 
which sex is defined by chromosomes, gonads and genitals, and is fixed at birth; medical, in which 
sex is defined by medical experts and changeable by sufficient medical treatment; and self-
identification, in which sex is defined by individuals themselves. 
New Zealand's current law is described in Part IV. It requires that as a result of medical 
treatment, the applicant's body conforms sufficiently to that of a person of the "nominated sex". 
Case law has established that this does not necessarily require surgery, although some degree of 
medical intervention, at least in the form of hormones, is required. Part V critiques this approach 
because of its reliance on the medical model of sex. This model relies on harmful social norms about 
gender and requires medical intervention which is either unattainable or undesirable for many trans 
people. This means that legal recognition is frequently out of reach. Additionally, by requiring 
medical intervention, this approach breaches human rights. 
In the last Part, I argue that New Zealand should adopt an approach based on self-identification 
for sex markers on birth certificates, as Argentina has done. This would be consistent with New 
Zealand's current approach to sex markers on passports and drivers' licences, which in both cases is 
based on self-identification.  
II SEX MARKERS ON BIRTH CERTIFICATES MATTER 
Unlike many countries, New Zealand does not have any official identity documents.16 A birth 
certificate is simply evidence that a birth occurred and in fact contains a disclaimer that, "this 
  
13  At [7.26]. 
14  See Spade, above n 3, at 29. 
15  See Dean Spade "Documenting Gender" (2008) 59 Hastings LJ 731 at 802–804 and 806. 
16   Transgender Report, above n 4, at [6.4]. 
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certificate is not evidence of the identity of the person presenting it".17 The Human Rights 
Commission's (HRC) 2007 report To Be Who I Am (the Transgender Report) was the first inquiry 
into trans experiences in New Zealand. It heard from over 200 trans people. It found that despite the 
disclaimer that birth certificates are not proof of identity, in practice they do have such a role. The 
report found that "documents issued by the state assist most people to verify their identity and most 
people refer to these documents as 'forms of identity'".18 Specifically, the ability to change the sex 
marker on birth certificates was important to trans people:19  
An amended birth certificate is often treated as proof of a person's sex. A trans person can then rely on 
the birth certificate for a variety of purposes, including establishing identity. 
The Transgender Report found that there were barriers to changing the sex marker on birth 
certificates and that this was an issue for trans people:20 
On the one hand, the difference between the sex recorded on a birth certificate and how a trans person 
presents often results in suspicion and/or discrimination. On the other hand, the majority of trans people 
were unable to comply with the statutory test for change of sex on a birth certificate, which might help 
to prevent such suspicion or discrimination.  
For example, people have been required to produce birth certificates to letting agencies21 and to 
prospective employers22 in order to verify their identity. When the sex marker does not match a 
person's identity, this can result in discrimination against the person concerned. 
In addition, birth certificates often act as a gateway to correcting a person's sex classification in 
institutions such as banks, hospitals and universities.23 A corrected birth certificate can facilitate the 
correction of sex/gender records in these other contexts, while if unchanged it can act as a barrier 
and source of discrimination. 
The introduction of a self-identification approach to the sex marker on passports has, to some 
extent, reduced the relevance of birth certificates.24 It is no longer necessary to have an amended 
  
17  Department of Internal Affairs "Certificate and Printout: Frequently Asked Questions" Department of 
Internal Affairs <www.dia.govt.nz>. 
18  Transgender Report, above n 4, at [6.4]. 
19  At [8.9]. 
20  At [6.24]. 
21  At [4.15]. 
22  At [3.45]. 
23  At [3.30]. 
24  Elisabeth McDonald and Jack Byrne "The Legal Status of Transgender and Transsexual Persons in 
Aotearoa New Zealand" in Jens Scherpe (ed) The Legal Status of Transsexual and Transgender Persons 
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birth certificate in order to change the sex marker on a passport, as it was previously.25 Passports are 
accepted in most contexts for identifying purposes. The new RealMe system of identification, which 
is used by all government departments and agencies, accepts passports as a basis of recognition.26 
On a day-to-day level, passports and drivers' licences are much more commonly used forms of 
identification than birth certificates. However, passports need to be renewed every five years,27 a 
somewhat inconvenient and expensive process for people who do not intend to travel. Birth 
certificates, by contrast are a permanent form of documentation. Because of this, they are still the 
most important identity document.28 
Additionally, despite the shift towards acceptance of passports to verify identity, there are some 
situations where birth certificates are the only relevant document. For example, a recent policy 
change has enabled trans prisoners who have changed the sex on their birth certificate to be housed 
in a prison that reflects their sex. Those who have not corrected their birth certificate will initially be 
housed in a prison that reflects the sex on their birth certificate. They must apply to the Chief 
Executive of the Department of Corrections to be housed in a prison that reflects their gender, with 
such cases being decided on a discretionary basis. Prisoners who have not changed their birth 
certificate and who are serving sentences or facing charges for serious sexual offending are not able 
to apply to be housed in the correct prison.29 This is discriminatory on the basis of whether a birth 
certificate has been changed, which illustrates their continued relevance.30  
Another example of the importance of corrected birth certificates is that the recorded sex of a 
parent on their child's birth certificate is determined according to the parent's birth certificate. The 
Transgender Report heard from a trans man who was told he could not be registered as his child's 
  
(Intersentia, Cambridge) (forthcoming) at 544–545. See Part V of this article for discussion of the passport 
policy.  
25  Department of Internal Affairs "Information about Changing Sex / Gender Identity" New Zealand Passports 
<www.passports.govt.nz>. 
26  New Zealand Government "Getting started with RealMe" RealMe <www.realme.govt.nz>. 
27  Department of Internal Affairs "Five year passports – some important information" New Zealand Passports 
<www.passports.govt.nz>. It has recently been announced that the validity of passports will be extended to 
10 years, see Peter Dunne "10-year passports enable reduction in annual cost" (25 May 2015) Beehive 
<www.beehive.govt.nz>. 
28  McDonald and Byrne, above n 24, at 544. 
29  Anne Tolley "Prison changes to increase rehab and safety" (25 September 2013) Beehive: the official 
website of the New Zealand Government <www.beehive.govt.nz>. 
30  See JustSpeak "Transgender prisoner press release" (4 April 2014) JustSpeak <justspeak.org.nz>. 
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father unless he changed the sex marker on his own birth certificate to male.31 There may be a 
similar issue where birth certificates are relevant to the sex recorded on a death certificate.32 
Perhaps most importantly, having a birth certificate that reflects a person's gender is an 
important affirmation of identity in itself.33 The Transgender Report quotes one respondent as 
saying: "My birth certificate is fixed as the world judged me when I couldn't speak for myself."34 
Birth certificates symbolise citizenship and so correct sex markers on birth certificates also 
symbolise recognition and belonging.  
III LEGAL MODELS FOR CHANGING SEX ON BIRTH 
CERTIFICATES 
Legal approaches to sex have varied across time and across jurisdictions. Franklin Romeo has 
classified these into three broad models in the United States context: the biological model, the 
medical model and the self-determination model.35 It should be noted both that this classification 
was in the context of litigation (regarding discrimination, healthcare and privacy) rather than 
identity documents, and that self-identification was discussed as a potential new model that did not 
yet exist in United States case law or legislation. In this Part, I briefly describe each of these models. 
I relate these models to the New Zealand context in the following Part. 
A The Biological Model 
The biological model is the most restrictive approach. The English case of Corbett v Corbett36 
in 1970 was the foundational Common Law case regarding the validity of marriages involving trans 
people.37 It was followed in several other jurisdictions.38 It found that chromosomes, genitals and 
gonads were determinants of sex for the purposes of marriage.39 Ormrod J ruled that "marriage is a 
relationship which depends on sex and not on gender",40 and that it was impossible to change one's 
  
31  Transgender Report, above n 4 at [4.12] 
32  McDonald and Byrne, above n 24, at 545, n 70. 
33  Transgender Report, above n 4, at [6.2]. 
34  At [6.20]. 
35  Franklin Romeo "Beyond the Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of Gender Identity in the 
Law" (2005) 36 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 713.  
36  Corbett v Corbett (Otherwise Ashley) [1970] 2 All ER 33.  
37  Grenfell, above n 6, at 69. 
38  Grenfell, above n 6, at 74–78. 
39  Corbett, above n 36, at 47 and 48. 
40  At 49.  
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sex even by surgically removing and reconstructing genitals.41 He also found that marriage required 
the capacity for "natural" heterosexual intercourse, and that this was impossible with an "artificial 
cavity".42  
While the Corbett decision related to marriage, the reasoning underpinning it continues to be 
followed in several jurisdictions in relation to birth certificates. Often this is characterised by a lack 
of legislative provision to enable a change of sex marker.43 For example, there are three states in the 
United States that do not allow sex markers on birth certificates to be changed, one of which has an 
express prohibition.44 There are also 14 countries in Europe which do not allow legal gender 
recognition for trans people at all.45  
B The Medical Model 
In many countries, the biological model has been rejected in favour of the medical model, which 
acknowledges the possibility of changing sex in some circumstances.46 As Romeo describes it, this 
model relies on medical evidence (which can be psychological, or physical, or both), "to establish 
gender transgression as legitimate and therefore worthy of recognition and protection under the 
law".47 There is a spectrum of approaches both between and within jurisdictions that fall under the 
medical model. 
At its most restrictive, recognition under this model is only available to "post-operative" trans 
people; that is, people who have surgery to reconstruct their genitals. Australian academics Laura 
Grenfell and Anne Hewitt call this a "sex as congruent anatomy and psychology" model.48 This 
approach exists for birth certificates in many jurisdictions, including almost all American states 
where changing the sex marker is possible,49 and most Australian states.50 Of the 35 countries in 
Europe where a legal change of sex is possible, 20 require surgery.51 
  
41  At 47. 
42  At 49. 
43  Laura Grenfell and Anne Hewitt "Gender Regulation: Restrictive, Facilitative or Transformative Laws?" 
(2012) 34 Syd LR 761 at 771–772. 
44  The states are Idaho, Ohio and Tennessee. Tennessee has an express prohibition. Lambda Legal "Changing 
Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State by State Guidelines" Lambda Legal <www.lambdalegal.org>. 
45  Transgender Europe "Trans Rights Europe Map 2014" (15 April 2014) Transgender Europe 
<www.tgeu.org>. 
46  Grenfell, above n 6, at 79–86. 
47  Romeo, above n 35, at 724. 
48  Grenfell and Hewitt, above n 43, at 766–769. 
49  There are 52 authorities that issue birth certificates in the United States. As of 2008, 19 had no official rule 
but allow the change in practice. The other 30 specifically authorised the changing of sex markers: Spade, 
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At the other end of the medical model spectrum is an approach which "gives primacy to 
behaviour and psychology and considers anatomy to be of secondary relevance".52 Grenfell and 
Hewitt do not consider this to be part of the medical model, describing it instead as 
"transformative".53 However they cite the Australian passport policy, which requires medical 
evidence of "appropriate clinical treatment"54 as an example of this approach.  They argue that this 
requirement could include counselling and other therapy, suggesting a more psychological focus.55 
According to the Australian Passport Office, the "appropriate clinical treatment" does not have to be 
specified so it is left up to the doctor to decide.56 In my view, the fact that any form of medical 
evidence is required situates this approach within the medical model, despite its potentially more 
flexible requirements than medical models that require surgery.   
C The Self-Identification Model 
The third model allows legal recognition of a person's sex based on self-identification. This 
approach is grounded in self-determination; that is, the idea that a person should be able to 
determine their own sex/gender for all purposes, and that gender is "a healthy and legitimate 
expression of a person's identity".57 Self-identification, at least for the purposes of this article, refers 
more specifically to the ability to identify as one chooses on legal documents.58 Under this model, 
  
above n 15, at 767–768. These numbers have not significantly changed, see Lambda Legal, above n 44. All 
of the jurisdictions that allow the change require surgery, except Oregon, Washington, Vermont and New 
York States, and the District of Columbia: Mary Emily O'Hara "AMA Says Transgender People Shouldn't 
Require Surgery to Change Their Birth Certificate" (12 June 2014) Vice News <news.vice.com>. 
50  Surgery to alter reproductive organs is required in New South Waltes, the Northern Territory, Queensland, 
Tasmania and Victoria. South Australia and Western Australia require a "medical or surgical procedure ... to 
alter the genitals". See Australian Human Rights Commission Sex Files: the Legal Recognition of Sex in 
Documents and Government Records (2009) at 16–17. See Grenfell and Hewitt, above n 43, at 773–778 for 
how the Western Australia and South Australia laws have been interpreted. The Australian Capital Territory 
changed its legislation in 2014, to require "appropriate clinical treatment". See Births, Deaths and Marriages 
Registration Act 1997 (ACT). 
51  Transgender Europe, above n 45. 
52  Grenfell and Hewitt, above n 43, at 769. 
53  At 762. 
54  Australian Passport Office "Sex and Gender Diverse Passport Applicants" Australian Passport Office 
<www.passports.gov.au>. 
55  Grenfell and Hewitt, above n 43, at 772. 
56  Australian Passport Office, above n 54. 
57  Romeo, above n 35, at 739 
58  Romeo uses "self-determination" because his article is about gender recognition more broadly, above n 35. 
The other authors cited in this article tend to be discussing identity documents so use "self-identification".  
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legal recognition is based solely on a person's identity and does not require any medical (or any 
other) evidence. 
Dean Spade, a trans activist, lawyer and academic, describes self-identification in the following 
terms:59 
I would like people to have the freedom to determine their own gender identity and expression … And I 
would want no person to be required to show medical or psychiatric evidence to document that they are 
who and what they say they are. I would like self identification to be the determining factor for a 
person's membership in a gender category to the extent that knowledge of the person's membership in 
such a category is necessary. 
The self-identification model is illustrated by Argentina's Gender Identity Law 2012,60 which 
has been praised by activists around the world.61 Article 4 requires that for a person's sex to be 
amended on their birth certificate and national identity card: they have to be at least 18 (there is a 
separate process for minors); submit a request to the relevant authority; and provide a new first 
name that they want to be registered under. The law is explicit that:62 
In no case will it be needed to prove that a surgical procedure for total or partial genital reassignment, 
hormonal therapies or any other psychological or medical treatment has taken place. 
This emphasis on not requiring medical evidence is key to self-identification. The very 
straightforward administrative procedure,63 rather than a court process, also illustrates that this law 
is based on self-identification. 
IV THE NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW  
In New Zealand, the process for changing sex markers on birth certificates is governed by s 28 
of the BDMRRA and has been clarified by case law, especially the Michael decision.64 The current 
legal position is somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of medical models described in the 
previous Part, because it requires some degree of medical intervention, but not necessarily surgery.  
  
59  Spade, above n 3, at 29. 
60  Ley No 26743 9 May 2012 (AR) (translated ed: Alejandra Sardá (translator) "Argentina's Gender Identity 
Law" Global Action for Trans Equality <transactivists.org>) [Gender Identity Law 2012 (Argentina)]. 
61  See for example Transgender Europe Legal Gender Recognition in Europe Toolkit (2013) at 49–54; Jack 
Byrne License to Be Yourself: Laws and advocacy for legal gender recognition of trans people  (The Open 
Society Foundations, New York, 2014) at 9, 17, 23, 24, 41 and 43–45; and Aotearoa New Zealand's Sexual 
Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex (SOGII) UPR Coalition 2013 "Submission from the Sexual 
Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex (SOGII) UPR Coalition 2013" at [13]. 
62  Gender Identity Law 2012 (Argentina), art 4. 
63  Article 6. 
64  "Michael" v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages (2008) 27 FRNZ 58 (FC) [Michael]. 
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When the BDMRRA was passed, New Zealand courts had already adopted the medical model of 
sex in the context of marriage in M v M65 and Attorney-General v Family Court at Otahuhu.66 In M 
v M, the court found a 12-and-a-half year marriage between a cisgender man and a trans woman was 
valid. Judge Aubin rejected Corbett, and concluded:67  
In so far as these proceedings come down in the end to the definition of "woman", there is no medical 
evidence in the case which is persuasive against the view that genetic considerations can be displaced by 
events occurring in the course of the person's life that cumulatively take that person out of the sexual 
category into which he or she was born through a state of limbo and into the haven of the opposite sex.  
Despite this relatively progressive approach to marriage, the courts had, some years earlier, been 
unable to take a similar approach to birth certificates. The case of Re T had found that changing the 
sex marker was not possible (except in the case of mistake at birth) because there was no statutory 
provision to enable such a change.68 
There is now a statutory provision in s 28 of the BDMRRA. The BDMRRA was introduced in 
1989 to consolidate and amend the existing births, deaths and marriages legislation. The clauses that 
became s 28 were the most contentious aspect of the Bill.69 As introduced, the Bill required that an 
applicant "has undergone surgical and medical procedures that have effectively given the person the 
physical conformation of a person of the opposite sex".70 However, the Select Committee thought 
this standard was too high, and so the provision was amended several times.71 The change in 
wording was summarised by MP Richard Northey during the third reading:72 
The select committee … recognised that it was principally a psychological, rather than a surgical, matter 
of identity, and that to require people to go through the full gamut of very expensive surgery in order 
simply to have themselves recorded on their birth certificate as being the sex with which they identify 
was inappropriate. 
Most of s 28 is straightforward. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that s 28 actually 
requires that a person is "not a person of the nominated sex",73 and that the person has assumed the 
  
65  M v M (marriage: transexuals) [1991] NZFLR 337 (FC). 
66  Attorney-General v Family Court at Otahuhu (1994) 12 FRNZ 643 (HC). 
67  M v M, above n 65, at 348. 
68  Re T [1975] 2 NZLR 449 (SC). 
69  (15 May 1990) 507 NZPD 1356 and (20 March 1991) 513 NZPD 940. 
70  Births, Deaths, and Marriages Registration Bill 1989 (193-1), cl 29(1)(b)(ii). 
71  See Michael, above n 64, at [41]–[51] for a thorough discussion of the legislative history. 
72  (28 March 1995) 547 NZPD 6465. 
73  Section 28(3)(b) (emphasis added).  
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"gender identity of a person of the nominated sex"74 and wishes that sex to appear on their birth 
certificate.75 Prima facie, this wording suggests that sex is biological and unchanging, and that it is 
gender identity, rather than sex, can change under a medical model.  
However, there are several reasons that the current interpretation of the legislation suggests a 
medical rather than biological approach to sex. First, the phrase "the gender identity of a person of 
the nominated sex" suggests that each sex has a corresponding gender identity (and that each gender 
identity has a corresponding sex), and that these will be congruent.  Secondly, it is "sex" that is 
recorded on birth certificates, and it is "sex" that is changed by the s 28 process. Finally and most 
relevantly, judges generally read this provision merely as a repetition of s 28(3)(a)(i), that a person's 
birth certificate records the person as being of a sex opposite to the nominated sex, rather than 
treating it as an additional requirement.76 In keeping with this, my critique of the section proceeds 
on this basis that s 28 sets up a medical, rather than biological, approach to sex. 
My focus in this article is on s 28(3)(c)(i), which contains three limbs that must each be satisfied 
"on the basis of expert medical evidence". The first limb requires that the applicant "has assumed (or 
has always had) the gender identity of a person of the nominated sex".77 This requirement has never 
been contentious. The second limb requires that the applicant:78  
… has undergone such medical treatment as is usually regarded by medical experts as desirable to 
enable persons of the genetic and physical conformation of the applicant at birth to acquire a physical 
conformation that accords with the gender identity of a person of the nominated sex. 
This "physical conformation" requirement is discussed in more detail below. The third limb 
requires that "as a result of the medical treatment undertaken, [the applicant will] maintain a gender 
identity of a person of the nominated sex".79 This requirement is rarely at issue, although in one case 
where the applicant's transition was relatively recent there was more emphasis on this.80 
  
74  Section 28(3)(b)(i). 
75  Section 28(3)(b)(ii). 
76  For example Michael, above n 64, at [56]–[57] and [84]–[85]; Re C-DCT [2012] NZFC 10036 at [6]–[7]; H 
v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages FC Waitakere FAM-2009-090-002000, 21 September 
2010 [H] at [21]–[22]; Kearney v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages of Auckland [2013] 
NZFC 4805 [Kearney] at [7] and [15]; and KRM v Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages of 
Wellington FC New Plymouth FAM-2009-043-000082, 1 April 2009 [KRM] at [4]. MMT v R-GBDM 
[2012] NZFC 3533 [MMT] is the only case where the distinction is made clear, at [9].  
77  Section 28(3)(c)(i)(A). 
78  Section 28(3)(c)(i)(B). 
79  Section 28(3)(c)(i)(C) (emphasis added). 
80  H, above n 76, at [26]–[27]. 
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The interpretation of s 28(3)(c)(i)(B) was uncertain until the 2008 Michael decision. Many 
submitters to the Transgender Inquiry in 2007 thought that this physical conformation 
requirement:81 
… meant that they must have had "full gender reassignment surgery". A number were given this advice 
by staff at the Department of Internal Affairs or at their local Family Court. Trans people said the 
statutory test was unfair and problematic given the reality that most will never be able to access the full 
range of surgical procedures.  
The Michael case arose partly in response these concerns.82 At issue in the Michael case was:83 
… at what point short of complete gender reassignment surgery a person's physical appearance has 
changed such that it "accords with the gender identity of a person of the nominated sex" [and] [m]ore 
particularly, whether an applicant must have undergone surgery to alter their genitals to satisfy that 
test[.] 
Judge Fitzgerald approached this section by looking carefully at the wording. He found that 
"medical" was defined in s 2 of the BMDRRA as including psychological and surgical treatment, 
and could also include hormone treatment.84 "Physical conformation", he said, "refers to the 
structure or appearance of the applicant's body or physical characteristics".85 He said:86  
I do not think it appropriate or relevant to talk in terms of "thresholds" or "points on the continuum of 
surgical treatments" in a generalised way in cases under the section. I do not believe Parliament intended 
there be a standardised test to apply to all applicants and to do so would be to misunderstand 
transsexualism and the treatment for it. … Just how much surgery [the applicant] needs to have had is 
determined on a case by case basis by reference to the evidence in the particular case, including that of 
the medical experts. 
Thus Judge Fitzgerald held that "full" surgery is not required, but indicated that some degree of 
surgery is necessary. On the facts of the case, he decided that a combination of psychological 
counselling, continuous hormone therapy for four years and a bilateral mastectomy were sufficient 
to meet the test in s 28.87 
  
81  As reported in the Transgender Report, above n 4, at [6.21]. 
82  Michael, above n 64, at [3]–[4], and [108]–[111]. 
83  At [71]. 
84  At [62]. 
85  At [66]. 
86  At [72]. 
87  At [88]–[90]. 
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In terms of the words "usually regarded by medical experts as desirable", Judge Fitzgerald found 
that this:88 
… means the assessment of what is desirable is that of a group or consensus of medical experts, rather 
than the opinion of an individual medical expert. The test is not what the applicant considers to be 
desirable for him/her to achieve personal comfort with, or physical conformity to, their nominated 
gender identity.  
Rather:89  
The focus of the legal test is the nature of the medical (psychological and surgical) treatment received 
and [its] effect on the degree to which the applicant's physical conformation accords with that of the 
nominated gender. 
In one recent case, Re C-DCT, the Court took a different approach and held that:90  
It is abundantly clear that the point at which treatment means a successful gender reassignment really 
comes down to a matter of individual choice and individual comfort. 
This emphasis on an individual's needs is an important shift away from the idea of medical 
consensus in the Michael case. It is important to note, however, that Re C-DCT is the only case 
which has taken this approach, and it is somewhat stretching the words of the section.  
The HRC's Human Rights in New Zealand report raised concerns about the interpretation of the 
physical conformation requirement, particularly in relation to trans women. It pointed out that 
Michael focused on the irreversible chest surgery, and that there was no equivalent procedure for 
trans women, who generally develop breasts through hormonal treatment rather than surgery.91 
Additionally, "the Commission has been informed of other decisions where trans women have been 
required to show evidence of full sex-reassignment surgery".92 This suggests an inconsistent 
interpretation, with the Court requiring surgery in some cases but not others. 
There are four subsequent cases where trans women were successful in their applications despite 
having undergone no surgery. However, two of the applicants said they wanted surgery but could 
not afford it,93 one was on the waiting list,94 and the other was about to undergo surgical 
  
88  At [63] (emphasis added). 
89  At [70]. 
90  Re C-DCT, above n 76, at [14]. 
91  Human Rights Commission, above n 11 at 319. 
92  At 319. This was not the outcome in any of the available cases, however. 
93  Basinger v Registrar General [2013] NZFC 3562 [Basinger] at [6]; and MMT, above n 76, at [7]. 
94  DAC v Registrar General Births Deaths & Marriages [2013] NZFC 1998 [DAC] at [13]. 
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treatment.95 Combined, these cases suggest that desire for surgery, if not actual plans for it, is 
considered to be a relevant factor. This presents a barrier for the large number of trans people, 
especially trans women, who never intend to have any surgery. 
The information on the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) website sets out the legislation and 
the Michael decision. It stresses that decisions are made on a case-by-case basis and that:96   
… every applicant does not have to go through full reconstructive surgery to meet the test, although 
some may do. The level of surgery required for each person will be particular to each person[.] 
The reference here to the "level of surgery" suggests that some surgery is required. This is 
inconsistent with the recent case law discussed above.  
The uncertainty about whether surgery is required is a problem for people who want to change 
the sex on their birth certificate. It is not appropriate that the level of intervention required is found 
in case law rather than clear legislation. The Transgender Report noted that a submitter had spent 
$2,000 on legal fees to go through this process.97 Section 28 should be reformed in order to avoid 
this complexity. 
V CRITIQUE OF S 28 AND THE MEDICAL MODEL OF SEX 
In the previous Part, I outlined s 28 and discussed the uncertainty regarding what level of 
medical intervention is required. This Part critiques s 28 more deeply by outlining the problems with 
the medical model of sex as it applies in this context. Regardless of the nature or degree of medical 
or surgical intervention required by judges, my argument is that the requirement for medical 
evidence at all is problematic. I discuss two major reasons for this: first, expectations of medical 
intervention frequently do not align with the needs or experiences that trans people have, and 
secondly, the requirement for medical intervention breaches human rights. 
A The Gulf between the Medical Model and Lived Experience 
Romeo argues that the medical model of sex "does not serve the vast majority of gender non-
conforming people."98 In New Zealand, this is highlighted by how few people have made use of s 
28. Between 1995 and 2007, 114 people made applications under this legislation.99 Between 2008 
and 2013, 105 applications were received.100 This makes a total of 219 between 1995 and 2013. 
  
95  H, above n 76, at [27]. 
96  Department of Internal Affairs "General information regarding Declarations of Family Court as to sex to be 
shown on birth certificates" Department of Internal Affairs <www.dia.govt.nz> at 3. 
97  Transgender Report, above n 4, at [6.23]. 
98  Romeo, above n 35, at 731. 
99 Transgender Report, above n 4, at [2.9]. 
100 McDonald and Byrne, above n 24, at 534, n 36. 
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There is no definitive record of the number of trans people in New Zealand, because the census does 
not collect this information and no national studies have been done. However, it is suggested that 
there are "at least a few thousand" trans people in New Zealand.101 A 2012 survey reported that one 
per cent of high school students identified as transgender and a further three per cent as not sure of 
their gender,102 suggesting that the trans population might be much larger than previously thought.  
My search of legal databases resulted in finding only 10 cases under s 28, out of those 219. All 
of the applicants in these cases were successful, and it is not clear how many applicants have been 
unsuccessful under this section. In any case, it is probable that people will only apply if they think 
they are likely to succeed. The gap between the 219 applications and the population of several 
thousand trans people shows that use of s 28 is not widespread – despite the barriers and 
discrimination that trans people face when their birth certificate is incorrect, as I outlined in Part II. 
In my view, the reason for this discrepancy is partly the uncertainty that I have already discussed, 
and partly financial and other barriers to accessing legal information. However, these are both 
underpinned by a bigger factor, which is that the medical model that s 28 is based on does not reflect 
the reality of trans lives.  
Franklin Romeo describes the medical model as a system "that regulates gender non-conformity 
and predicates legal rights on access to healthcare".103 Both the regulation of gender non-conformity 
and the requirement of healthcare as a prerequisite to accessing legal rights are present in the 
wording and operation of s 28. They are intertwined to a large extent, since requiring medical 
intervention is itself based on normative assumptions about trans identity. 
Romeo has argued in the United States context that the medical model of sex sets up hyper-
normative standards of gender and fails to recognise lived experience and complexity.104 Courts 
recognise trans identity only when it conforms to expected standards; transgressive experiences of 
gender are fraudulent or illegitimate.105 The question is not whether the person has had the medical 
treatment appropriate for their needs, but whether the result is a "body and behaviour that 
sufficiently conform to normative gender standards so as to be considered legitimate in the eyes of 
the court".106  
  
101 At 535. 
102 TC Clark and others Youth'12 Overview: The health and wellbeing of New Zealand secondary school 
students in 2012 (University of Auckland, Auckland, 2012) at 25. 
103 Romeo, above n 35, at 730. 
104 At 731. 
105 At 733. 
106 At 734. 
 SEX MARKERS ON BIRTH CERTIFICATES 73 73 
Section 28 of the BDMRRA operates in a similar way. It gives medical "experts" (who are 
generally not trans) the power to scrutinise a person's body and experience in order to decide 
whether they have "really" transitioned to the "nominated sex". As I discussed in Part IV, what is 
"desirable" for each person to complete their transition is not defined by the person themselves, nor 
even by their doctor, but by a standard of what is "usually" considered desirable by the medical 
profession as a whole.107 Individual cases are decided not in isolation but with reference to 
precedent, usually the Michael case. Direct comparisons are not often made explicitly, however, in 
AB, the applicant was classified as "further along the continuum than the applicant in Re 
Michael".108 
One of the major normative assumptions about trans people is that they want, need and can 
afford all available medical intervention (and that they will qualify for it and be able to access it).109 
This is explicit in s 28 itself, and further emphasised in the case law. The Michael judgment sets out 
the "typical" course of treatment expected of trans people in a passage cited in several subsequent 
cases:110  
There are typically four steps of treatment, namely psychiatric assessment, hormonal treatment, a period 
of living as a member of the opposite sex subject to professional supervision and therapy (the "real life 
experience"), and finally, in suitable cases, gender reassignment surgery. Surgical intervention takes 
many forms and, for a variety of reasons, is undertaken by different people to different extents. 
This suggests that trans people who do not access the full range of medical intervention 
expected of them are unlikely to meet the physical conformation requirement of the BDMRRA. I 
have already discussed surgery. "Real life experience" is sometimes mentioned in the cases but not 
emphasised as a requirement111 – possibly because it is generally presumed to be met by applicants. 
In terms of psychological assessment, a diagnosis of gender identity disorder was mentioned in three 
cases,112 and gender dysphoria was diagnosed once.113 All of the other cases mention psychological 
  
107 Michael, above n 64, at [63]. 
108 Re AB FC Auckland FAM-2009-004-001341, 16 November 2009 at [10]. 
109 Spade, above n 15, at 754–756. 
110 Michael, above n 64, at [30]; quoted in Re AB above n 108, at [10]; and H above n 76, at [17]. 
111 Re AB, above n 108, at [24]; DAC, above n 94, at [8] and [13]; H, above n 76, at [10], and [11]; Lucas v 
Registrar-General Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NZFC 6612 [Lucas] at [7]; Michael, above n 64 at 
[16] and [19]; and MMT, above n 76, at [4]. 
112 AB, above n 108, at [24]; DAC, above n 94, at [8]–[9]; H, above n 76, at [6]–[7]. 
113 Michael, above n 64, at [16]. 
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assessment but do not use these labels.114 Similarly, in all of the cases the applicant had been 
undergoing hormonal treatment, intending to continue it permanently.115  
The medical model presents a barrier for people who cannot access medical intervention to the 
degree required, whether this is due to expense, discrimination or the healthcare simply not being 
available.116 Most healthcare required by trans people is not publicly funded in New Zealand, and 
often trans people are excluded from healthcare that is available to other groups of people.117 For 
example, many trans people have to pay for their own psychological assessments (which seem to be 
required under s 28, and are also frequently needed as a prerequisite to accessing hormones).118 The 
Transgender Report found that people were paying up to $1000 for this assessment.119 Hormone 
treatment is not always accessible,120 and genital surgery is out of reach for most trans people, due 
to its high cost and very limited availability in New Zealand.121  
Transition-related healthcare is a necessity for many trans people, and I do not wish to detract 
from the need for substantial reform in this area.122 However, even if trans people were able to 
access the healthcare they required, the more fundamental problem with legal recognition being 
based on medical intervention would remain. Some trans people have benefited from being 
recognised by the medical model of sex.123 Other trans people however, will never attain legal 
recognition from a system premised on medical authority over their bodies, either because it is 
impossible for them to express their identity and experiences in a way that fits this model,124 or 
  
114 Basinger, above n 93, at [5] and [7]; C-DCT, above n 76, at [12]; Kearney, above n 76, at [10]; KRM, above 
n 76, at [10]; Lucas, above n 111 at [7]; and MMT, above n 76, at [5]. 
115 Re AB, above n 108 at [6] and [8]; Basinger, above n 93 at [5] and [10]; C-DCT, above n 76, at [12] and 
[22]; DAC, above n 94, at [7]; H, above n 76, at [7] and [27]; Kearney, above n 76, at [4] and [10]; KRM, 
above n 76, at [7]; Lucas, above n 111, at [7]; Michael, above n 64, at [12]; and MMT, above n 76, at [4] and 
[9].  
116 See generally Romeo, above n 35, at 734–738; and Spade, above n 15, at 751–759 for effects on low income 
people in the United States context. 
117 Transgender Report, above n 4, at [5.36]–[5.37]. 
118 At [5.30]. 
119 At [5.21]–[5.25]. 
120 At [5.8], [5.17] and [5.71]. 
121 At [5.44]–[5.45] and [5.88]–[5.95]. 
122 See Transgender Report, above n 4, at ch 5 for discussion of inequalities and discrimination in healthcare 
for trans people in New Zealand. 
123 See Spade, above n 3, at 30. 
124 Jonathan L Koenig "Distributive Consequences of the Medical Model" (2011) 46 Harv CR-CL L Rev 619 at 
627 and 629. 
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because their political conception of their identity is so far removed from this model that they refuse 
to partake in it.125  
Some trans people are politically opposed to the medical model, but navigate it successfully in 
order to attain healthcare or legal recognition.126 Spade describes this as "selective recitation" of 
one's experiences in a way that meets normative expectations.127 This includes emphasis on 
stereotypically gendered childhood experiences such as (for trans men) dressing up as a boy for 
Halloween, playing with trucks instead of dolls, and having short hair.128 It also includes a desire to 
"pass" as one's self-identified gender full-time.129 Spade himself rejects these narratives, but 
recognises the risk in doing so: "What if it means I'm not 'real'?"130  
Spade explains the inconsistency between trans experience and normative expectations in the 
following description of his experience trying to get chest surgery:131 
I was experiencing acutely the gulf between trans community understandings of our bodies, our 
experiences, and our liberation, and the medical interpretations of our lives. … My quest for body 
alteration had to be legitimized by a medical reference to, and a pretended belief in, a binary gender 
system that I had been working to dismantle since adolescence. Later, as I contended with my own legal 
gender status and that of my clients, I would learn that not only medical treatment, but also legal rights 
and social services for trans people are dependent upon successful navigation of that medical system. 
While the context is different, Spade's experiences illustrate the uncomfortable compromises 
many trans people make in order to attain recognition. It is impossible to know how many of the 
applicants in the available New Zealand cases were engaging in "selective recitation" of identity 
narratives. Given that legal recognition of their identity hinges on proving their "realness" to the 
courts, it is a logical strategy. The successful applicants could shape their narrative enough to fit the 
court's requirements, but this leaves out those for whom this is impossible, either due to political 
conviction or because their reality is just too different to normative expectations to be able to shape 
their experience in that way. 
  
125 Koenig, above n 124, at 628–629. 
126 Spade, above n 3, at 23; Koenig, above n 124, at 629; and Vade, above n 6, at 272–273. 
127 Spade, above n 3, at 20. 
128 At 20 and 24. 
129 At 21. 
130 At 20. 
131 At 23–24. 
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B The Medical Model is Inconsistent with International Law 
Legal recognition of gender identity is a human right in international law. This is set out in the 
Yogyakarta Principles, which were developed as an application of existing international human 
rights instruments, such as the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR)132 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),133 to rights in relation to sexual 
orientation and gender identity.134 In New Zealand, these principles have "become recognised as a 
useful statement of international human rights law".135 Yogyakarta Principle 3 states,136  
Each person's self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their personality and is 
one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom. No one shall be forced to 
undergo medical procedures, including sex reassignment surgery, sterilisation or hormonal therapy, as a 
requirement for legal recognition of their gender identity. 
One of the mechanisms for monitoring compliance with international human rights law is the 
United Nations' Universal Periodic Review (UPR). A submission was made to New Zealand's 2013 
UPR by the Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex (SOGII) Coalition, which was 
comprised of 11 organisations, including GenderBridge, Agender Christchurch, TransAdvocates 
and Intersex Trust Aotearoa. The submission pointed out that s 28 is in breach of Yogyakarta 
Principle 3,137 and requested that the Government:138 
… enable adults with intersex conditions and trans and other gender diverse adults to change the sex 
details on any official documentation to male, female or indeterminate based solely on the individual's 
self-identification, without any requirement for medical treatment and without the need to resort to a 
court process. 
  
132 Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217 (1948). 
133 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976). 
134 International Commission of Jurists Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the application of international 
human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity (March 2007) [The Yogyakarta 
Principles]. 
135 Human Rights Commission, above n 11, at 309 
136 The Yogyakarta Principles, above n 134, at 11–12. 
137 SOGII UPR Coalition, above n 61, at [8] and [12]. 
138 At [f]. 
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Concern about human rights breaches has often focussed on mandatory sterilisation as a 
requirement for obtaining legal recognition of gender identity.139 This amounts to a violation of the 
right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, in art 5 of the UNDHR 
and art 7 of the ICCPR. The emphasis of this concern is often the requirement for surgery,140 but it 
should be noted that hormonal treatment also frequently results in sterilisation.141 Laws that require 
hormone therapy as a prerequisite to legal recognition (which is effectively the situation under s 28) 
are therefore also in breach of human rights. 
The SOGII UPR submission recommended that the Government:142 
… remove any requirement to undergo or intend to undergo medical or surgical procedures, including 
those that may result in sterilisation, as a prerequisite for changing sex details on a birth certificate or 
other official document[.] 
The recommendations in the SOGII submission were not included in the recommendations 
made to New Zealand by the Universal Periodic Review. However, the Government has indicated 
an intention to "follow up on these issues".143  
Spade writes that the medical model was in its time a progressive step forward for trans people 
because it offered some rights as opposed to none: "to some extent, the medicalization of trans 
identity was at one time a progressive step toward dignity and equality because it was preferable to 
total illegitimacy and criminality".144 The same is true in the New Zealand context: for those who 
have made use of it, s 28 has been an important piece of legislation, but there are now calls to 
reform this law.145 Given the problems inherent in a medical model of sex which I have outlined in 
this Part, it is time to move to a model based on self-identification rather than medical evidence. 
This is the focus of the next Part.  
  
139 Juan Méndez Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment (United Nations General Assembly, A/HRC/22/53, February 2013) at [38], [78], [79] and 
[88]. 
140 At [77]. 
141 Eli Coleman and others Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender and Gender-
Nonconforming People (7th ed, World Professional Association for Transgender Health, [no location 
given], 2012) at 50. 
142 SOGII UPR Coalition, above n 61, at [e]. 
143 New Zealand Government "New Zealand Government Response to 2014 UPR recommendations" Human 
Rights Commission < www.hrc.co.nz> at [3]. 
144 Spade, above n 3, at 31–32. 
145 SOGII UPR Coalition, above n 61, at [7]–[17] and [e]–[g]; and draft Member's Bill, prepared by members 
of the trans community and submitted to Louisa Wall MP, on file with author. 
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VI SELF-IDENTIFICATION FOR BIRTH CERTIFICATES IN 
NEW ZEALAND  
Self-identification is an appropriate standard for changing sex markers on birth certificates in 
New Zealand. This was demonstrated in the previous Part, where I discussed the ways that the 
medical model privileges the views of "experts" above the experiences of the individual concerned, 
and breach human rights. This Part points out that in addition to the arguments in favour of self-
identification that I have already discussed, self-identification on birth certificates would result in 
consistency with other identity documents. I then reject other reform options, outline how self-
identification would work and finally address potential criticisms of this reform.  
A Consistency with Drivers' Licences and Passports 
Self-identification already exists in New Zealand in two important contexts. The DIA changed 
its passport policy in 2012. Previously, a trans person who had not changed the sex details on their 
birth certificate could only change their passport sex marker to "X". Now, an applicant can choose 
the sex that appears on their passport (M, F, or X) even if this conflicts with the sex on their birth 
certificate.146 The New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) also changed its policy in 2013. While 
sex details do not actually appear on drivers' licences, they are kept in a register by NZTA, which is 
accessible by police officers. The options are now male, female or indeterminate.147 The New 
Zealand passport policy is thought to be the most progressive passport policy in the world.148  
As discussed in Part II, passports are accepted as identity documents in most (but not all) 
contexts. It makes sense to have the same standard for birth certificates as for passports, as there is 
no material difference in their function as identity documents and not everyone has a passport or 
wishes to get one.149 Additionally, for the majority of people who do have both a passport and a 
birth certificate, it makes sense for these to be consistent. 
According to the Transgender Report:150 
The Department of Internal Affairs said the rationale supporting their transgender policies focused on 
the need for certainty and accuracy in the information recorded on the registers of births, deaths and 
marriages and on certificates issued on the basis of that information. Officials said: 'This need for 
  
146 Department of Internal Affairs, above n 25. 
147 New Zealand Transport Agency "Replacing or changing your licence" New Zealand Transport Agency 
<www.nzta.govt.nz>. 
148 Byrne, above n 61, at 20–21. 
149 The ACT Law Reform Advisory Council made this point when considering options for legislative reform in 
the ACT: ACT Law Reform Advisory Council Beyond the Binary: legal recognition of sex and gender 
diversity in the ACT (ACT Law Reform Advisory Council, LRAC 2, March 2012) at 39–40. 
150 Transgender Report, above n 4, at [8.30]. 
 SEX MARKERS ON BIRTH CERTIFICATES 79 79 
certainty, however, is balanced to a certain extent, against an individual's right to identify themselves as 
they see fit.' 
It further noted:151 
There are legitimate and important state interests in ensuring that birth certificates and other similar 
documents accurate reflect the true details of a person's identity (such as their sex) to prevent the 
fraudulent or unlawful use of the document. 
It is interesting that a restrictive approach to changing the sex marker on birth certificates is here 
characterised as certain and accurate, and contrasted with self-identification. The opposite is in fact 
true: laws which make it difficult to change one's birth certificate mean that there is inconsistency 
between a person's birth certificate, their recorded sex on other documents (for example, licences 
and passports), and their identity. This leads to more inaccuracy, confusion and inconsistency than a 
model based on self-identification would. 
B Inadequacy of Other Reform Options 
The Transgender Report recommended changing s 28(3)(c)(i) to require that the court:152 
… is satisfied on the basis of expert medical evidence that the applicant … (B) has taken decisive steps 
to live fully and permanently in the gender identity of the nominated sex; and (C) will, as a result of 
those decisive steps, maintain a gender identity of a person of the nominated sex.  
Although this provision would have been a step forward prior to the Michael decision, it would 
be an insufficient remedy to the challenges that I have presented. Because it requires medical 
evidence, it is still based on the medical model, which privileges the views of "experts" above the 
experience of the people concerned, and continues the gatekeeping role of the medical profession. It 
is not at all evident that this would be a "robust and clear statutory test"153 as the HRC claims. 
"Decisive steps" would need judicial clarification in the same way that the current law has evolved 
through case law. It is not clear whether these have to be medical steps, although this is implied by 
the HRC's statement that such a provision would reflect the "broad range of medical steps that will 
be taken by most trans people".154 
An alternative option would be to leave the legislation as it is, and instead have the Principal 
Family Court Judge issue a practice note about how the section should be interpreted.155 This would 
  
151 At [8.32]. 
152 At [9.33] (emphasis in original). 
153 At [9.34]. 
154 At [9.35]. 
155 McDonald and Byrne, above n 24, at 567. 
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have the benefit of avoiding the time, cost and potential controversy of legislative change. A 
practice note could set out the degree of medical evidence required. It could reflect and clarify the 
current case law, so that surgery is not required but some medical intervention (such as hormones) 
is. Alternatively it could go further and state that while medical evidence is required, it only needs to 
be evidence of the person's identity and not necessarily of any intervention. This would be stretching 
the wording of s 28, which requires that the applicant "has undergone medical treatment". In any 
case, it would still mean that decisions about the validity of trans identity and experience were left to 
doctors and judges, rather than trans people themselves. It is therefore subject to the criticisms of the 
medical model that I have discussed Part V. 
The legislative reform suggested by the HRC and the possibility of a practice note would both 
go some way in clarifying and confirming the existing law. The practice note option could 
potentially go beyond existing case law, however neither option remedies the fundamental flaws 
inherent in the medical model of sex, because both remain reliant on the presence of medical 
evidence. As discussed in Part V, the medical model undermines trans identities by privileging the 
opinions of medical professionals over trans people's own experiences of their bodies and their lives. 
The only way to remedy this fully is to reform the law so that it is based entirely on self-
identification. 
C The Implementation of a Self-Identification Model to Birth 
Certificates 
Adopting a self-identification model would create more consistency between records. It would 
also allow trans people an important affirmation of their identity, and reduce the barriers for 
recognition in other contexts, as described in Part II. There are two examples that can be followed. 
The first is the DIA and NZTA policies described above. The other is the Argentinian law, which as 
discussed in Part III, is praised by activists internationally. 
The DIA and NZTA policies require a statutory declaration by the applicant expressing which 
gender they want to be recorded as, and how long they have lived in that gender (although nothing 
turns on this second requirement).156 Each of these policies also includes a third option for people 
who do not identify as either of the binary genders ("X" and "indeterminate" respectively),157 and 
allow unlimited changes (although the DIA points out that multiple changes may cause issues when 
travelling internationally).158 Both of these policies conform to international best practice.159  
  
156 Department of Internal Affairs, above n 25; and New Zealand Transport Agency, above n 147. 
157 Department of Internal Affairs, above n 25; and New Zealand Transport Agency, above n 147. 
158 Department of Internal Affairs, above n 25. 
159 Byrne, above n 61, at 20–21 discusses these policies. They also conform with the best practice set out by 
Transgender Europe, above n 61, at 57–59. 
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Similarly, Argentina's Gender Identity Law provides an example of how this model can be 
applied to birth certificates. As already mentioned, it is generally seen as the most progressive 
gender recognition legislation. A similar law has recently passed in Denmark,160 and Malta is also 
considering this model.161 There are several proposed Bills in Ireland, one of which, the Gender 
Recognition Bill 2013, models the Argentinian law very closely.162 This Bill provides an illustration 
of how self-identification can be legislated for in a Common Law jurisdiction.163 
Section 28 should be reformed so that it simply requires a statutory declaration of a person's sex. 
Statutory declarations must be in the form prescribed in sch 1 of the Oaths and Declarations Act 
1957, and signed by an authorised person, such as a lawyer or Justice of the Peace.164 This would 
remove the need for medical evidence and significantly simplify the process. The authorised person 
would not determine the validity of the applicant's sex, but verify that the person had signed the 
statutory declaration. 
D Responses to Potential Concerns 
Section 28 of the BDMRRA has not been debated in New Zealand since it passed in 1995. The 
recent DIA and NZTA policy changes do not seem to have provoked any criticism or backlash. As 
such, it is difficult to assess what the concerns might be raised about a model of self-identification in 
New Zealand. Some common concerns that have been raised internationally, and responses to them, 
are as follows. 
One argument is that self-identification on birth certificates could lead to identity fraud.165 This 
overlooks that (binary) sex markers identify a person as being one person of roughly 50 per cent of 
the population and are not a useful form of identification.166 Fraud could be far more easily 
committed by changing one's name, which is straightforward to do by statutory declaration in New 
Zealand.167 In any case, fraud is a crime and would be treated as such if it arose.168 During the first 
  
160 ILGA Europe "Denmark becomes the first European country to allow legal change of gender without 
clinical diagnosis" ILGA Europe <www.ilga-europe.org>. 
161 Neil Falzon "A Proposed Gender Identity Act for Malta" (December 2010) Malta Gay Rights Movement 
<www.maltagayrights.org>. 
162 Gender Recognition Bill 2013 (56) (introduced as Member's Bill by Deputy Snodaigh). 
163 Byrne, above n 61, at 36. 
164 Authorised people are set out in s 9 of the Oaths and Declarations Act 1957. 
165 Transgender Europe, above n 61, at 60; and Kristin Wenstrom ""What the Birth Certificate Shows": An 
Argument To Remove Surgical Requirements from Birth Certificate Amendment Policies" (2008) 17 Law 
& Sex 131 at 154. 
166 Spade, above n 15 at 802–803. 
167 Department of Internal Affairs "Changing a Name" <www.dia.govt.nz>. 
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year after the passage of Argentina's legislation, 3,000 people changed their identity documents with 
no reported cases of fraud.169 
Another argument is that men would change their sex to female in order to access, gender-
segregated spaces such as women's prisons or women's public toilets.170 Underlying this concern 
that people with "male" genitalia will be allowed in female spaces is an implicit fear that trans 
women are more likely to be physically or sexually violent towards other women, which is a 
baseless assumption.171 Additionally, arguments like this tend to shift the focus away from policies 
which actually make those spaces safer for women.172  
Another concern is that people would "change back" to their "original" gender.173 This is 
reflected in s 28's requirement for permanency.174 Critics have failed to point out why this would 
actually be a problem. Most trans people do not "change back".175 More importantly however, if 
people do wish to change their identity more than once there should not be barriers to doing so.176 
The Argentinian law explicitly recognises this (although subsequent changes require judicial 
authorisation).177 The analogy can again be made to name changes: divorced women frequently 
revert to their maiden name and this does not create any problems.178 There is no logical reason for 
sex markers to be treated any differently. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The provision for changing sex markers on birth certificates in s 28 of the BDMRRA does not 
enable the majority of trans people to make this change. As I have shown, birth certificates matter to 
trans people because they are an expression of identity and citizenship, and because birth certificates 
with the correct sex marker can facilitate recognition of identity in various settings. I have set out 
the three major legal approaches to sex: biological, medical and self-identification. Each of these is 
  
168 Crimes Act 1961 ss 228, 240 and 241. 
169 Transgender Europe, above n 61, at 60. 
170 Transgender Europe, above n 61, at 60; and Wenstrom above n 165, at 147. 
171 Wenstrom above n 165, at 148 and 151; and Spade, above n 15, at 810. 
172 Wenstrom above n 165, at 149. 
173 Transgender Europe, above n 61, at 61; and Wenstrom above n 165, at 156. 
174 Section 28(3)(c)(i)(C). 
175 Wenstrom above n 165, at 156. 
176 Byrne, above n 61, at 18–19; and Wenstrom above n 165, at 156. 
177 Gender Identity Law 2012 (Argentina), art 8. 
178 Wenstrom, above n 171, at 156–157. 
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currently followed in different jurisdictions with regard to birth certificates. Argentina was the first 
country to adopt the self-identification approach, and others are looking to this example. 
Section 28 of the BMDRRA is based on the medical model, because it requires medical 
evidence of physical conformity of the applicant's body to that of a person of the "nominated sex". 
Michael and other cases have established that surgery is not always required, however the degree 
intervention that is required remains unclear. While not all applicants in the available cases had 
undergone surgery, all expressed some degree of desire for it. Additionally, all of the applicants 
were undergoing hormone treatment and all had had some form of psychological assessment.  
The medical model is based on normative expectations of trans experience. Some people's 
experiences fit these requirements, however many others cannot afford, cannot access or do not 
want medical intervention. Additionally, the current law is inconsistent with the right to self-
determination of gender identity set out in Yogyakarta Principle 3, both by requiring medical 
evidence at all and by requiring hormone treatment, which frequently results in sterilisation. Reform 
options that are based on the medical model are insufficient to counter these critiques. 
Self-identification already exists in New Zealand for passports and drivers' licences, and it 
makes sense to have a consistent approach. Accordingly, I have suggested that s 28 should be 
amended to simply require a statutory declaration as to the applicant's sex. Finally, I have 
demonstrated that potential concerns raised about the self-identification model are likely to be 
unfounded.  
The reform of s 28 so that it is based on self-identification rather than the medical model would 
remove one of the barriers that trans people currently face in seeking legal recognition of their 
identity. It would be a significant improvement on the current law and allow many more people 
access to a corrected birth certificate. This would have a number of positive flow-on effects of trans 
identity being recognised and validated. However, any reform that occurs must take into account 
other criticisms of the current law, and must be done in consultation with trans, intersex, non-binary 
and other gender diverse communities. 
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